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A RIGHT/DUTY PERSPECTIVE ON THE 
LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE NO-DUTY-TO-RESCUE RULE 
PHILIP W. ROMOHR 
You don’t have to help anybody. That’s what this country’s all about.1 
INTRODUCTION 
In the American common law, a bystander generally has no duty 
to rescue a stranger in peril.2 As is true with many tort doctrines 
today, however, there are several exceptions to this rule.3 In addition, 
the absence of a duty to rescue, especially when such rescue could be 
accomplished with little or no risk to the rescuer (generally termed an 
“easy” rescue), has been criticized by the vast majority of legal 
scholarship on the subject.4 Despite these limitations, and despite 
sweeping changes made in other tort doctrines, the no-duty-to-rescue 
rule survives.5 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Philip W. Romohr. 
 1. Seinfeld: The Finale (NBC television broadcast May 14, 1998), available at http://www. 
seinfeldscripts.com/TheFinale.htm. 
 2. See, e.g., Fultz v. Union-Commerce Assocs., 683 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Mich. 2004) (“[A]s a 
general rule, there is no duty that obligates one person to aid or protect another.” (quoting 
Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Mich. 1988))); Parra v. 
Tarasco, Inc., 595 N.E.2d 1186, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“The common law recognizes no 
general duty to aid a person in peril.”). 
 3. In State v. Miranda, 715 A.2d 680 (Conn. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 864 A.2d 1 
(Conn. 2004), the Connecticut Supreme Court identified four situations in which a legal duty to 
aid may be imposed: “(1) where one stands in a certain relationship to another; (2) where a 
statute imposes a duty to help another; (3) where one has assumed a contractual duty; and (4) 
where one voluntarily has assumed the care of another.” Id. at 687. 
 4. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 341 (4th ed. 1971) (“Such 
decisions [affirming the no-duty rule] are revolting to any moral sense. They have been 
denounced with vigor by legal writers.”). 
 5. See Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, 46 
DEPAUL L. REV. 315, 316 (1997). 
In the face of continuous academic attacks, one body of tort law has survived this 
century, at least superficially, intact—the duty (or lack thereof) to rescue. Today, it is 
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Why does the no-duty-to-rescue rule still prevail? After a 
century of courts increasingly imposing duties upon citizens, why is 
there still no general duty to rescue in the common law?6 What is it 
about the principles behind a duty to rescue that allows judges today 
to make numerous inroads upon the rule, yet keeps them wedded to 
legal opinions a century old? 
This Note will suggest that the answer to these questions lies in 
the concept of rights. The fact pattern of the classic duty to rescue 
case is unique in that it highlights the notions of personal autonomy 
and the individual right of freedom of action.7 Whatever justification 
a judge or justice may give in an opinion, the principle behind most 
decisions perpetuating the no-duty rule is the protection of individual 
rights. In addition, cases adopting exceptions to the general rule and 
questioning the propriety of the rule—by imposing a duty to rescue—
can be viewed as implicitly rejecting the primacy of individual rights. 
To say that “rights” are the determining factor in duty to rescue 
doctrine means little, however, without articulating several theories 
behind the concept of rights and duties. 
This Note makes two interrelated arguments. First, the legal 
rules on the duty to rescue are best explained and understood by 
examining the rights and duties of the victim and potential rescuer. 
Second, a proper conception of rights and duties justifies the lack of a 
general legal duty to rescue. 
Part I examines the scope of the duty to rescue, from early cases 
defining the rule strictly through the enumeration of exceptions. The 
early common law used two distinctions—between moral and legal 
duties, and between positive acts and the failure to act—to explain 
the lack of a legal duty to rescue. Subsequent cases have created 
exceptions to this rule based on special relationships and the actions 
of a potential rescuer. A few state legislatures have created statutory 
exceptions as well. Part I concludes by recognizing the popular belief 
that the erosion of the no-duty-to-rescue rule will continue. 
 
commonly understood that there is no general, nonstatutory duty to rescue another in 
peril, not even a minimal duty that could be discharged by a riskless warning, absent a 
special relationship. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 6. Many European civil law countries, by contrast, impose a duty to rescue by statute. See 
Marc A. Franklin, Comment, Vermont Requires Rescue, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 59 & n.56 (1972) 
(identifying thirteen such countries). 
 7. For an example, see the hypothetical in the discussion of Buch v. Amory Manufacturing 
Co., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898), infra Part I.A. 
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Part II shifts the focus from legal precedent to legal theory. It 
explores the positions of several competing theories of political/legal 
philosophy on the duty to rescue another in peril—theories based on 
morality, utilitarianism, economics, Locke’s social contract, and an 
offshoot of social contract theory called liberal-communitarianism. 
This Part ultimately finds that most, if not all, of these theories 
support some form of a duty to rescue. 
Part III presents another theory, premised on the concepts of a 
negative state and individual rights, which advocates a rights/duty 
paradigm for examining the duty to rescue. This Part draws largely 
upon the works of philosopher Ayn Rand and Professor Ernest 
Weinrib to set out a rigid conception of individual rights and the role 
of the negative state in protecting those rights. Based upon these 
principles, it expounds the rights/duty paradigm, which views persons 
as discrete holders of negative rights and negative duties. It concludes 
by explaining how this paradigm only works if one conceives of a duty 
as a pre-interaction obligation rather than a subjective, after-the-fact 
assessment of responsibility. 
Part IV employs this rights/duty paradigm to critique the 
competing theories in Part II.8 It concludes that four of the theories 
are clearly inconsistent with the previously defined notions of 
individual rights and the negative state, and that each of those 
theories’ treatment of the duty to rescue suffers because of that 
inconsistency. It also concludes that one theory, Locke’s Social 
Contract, may or may not be consistent with the concepts of 
individual rights and the negative state, depending on one’s 
interpretation of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government. 
Finally, Part V returns to the legal doctrines described in Part I 
and assesses the implications of the rights/duty paradigm for these 
doctrines. It explains why the rights/duty paradigm largely, but not 
completely, embraces the dichotomies between law vs. morality and 
action vs. inaction. It also illustrates how the early common law cases 
implicitly adopted a discrete rights/duty model when deciding 
whether a duty to rescue existed. Finally, this Part determines which 
of the exceptions to the general rule discussed in Part I can properly 
exist under a rights/duty paradigm. It concludes that such a duty is 
 
 8. This approach to analyzing the duty to rescue through abstract, even philosophical, 
views is novel but not unique. See generally Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to 
Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REV. 673 (1994) (exploring the positions of Locke, Kant, and Hegel, then 
propounding a “liberal-communitarian” theory of the duty to rescue). 
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justified when the potential rescuer upsets the balance between 
negative rights. 
I.  LEGAL DOCTRINE ON THE DUTY TO RESCUE 
There is no general common law duty to rescue a stranger in 
peril,9 though several exceptions exist.10 This Part will first examine 
the early common law to determine the rationales behind the rule. It 
finds clear dichotomies between legal and moral duties, and between 
acts of misfeasance and acts of nonfeasance. It will then explore the 
exceptions to the general rule, including both common law and 
statutorily created duties. Finally, this Part notes that the erosion of 
the no-duty rule will likely continue. 
A. Early Common Law: The Moral/Legal and 
Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinctions 
Perhaps the most famous case on the duty to rescue in tort law is 
Buch v. Amory Manufacturing Co.11 In Buch, an eight-year-old boy 
accompanied his thirteen-year-old brother to the defendant’s mill, 
where the older brother worked. The overseer of the workers told the 
boy to leave, but the boy, not comprehending English, remained.12 
The boy’s hand was subsequently caught in a gearing mechanism and 
injured.13 The plaintiff charged the mill with negligence for not 
forcibly ejecting the boy once his presence was known.14 
In finding for the mill, the court noted that the defendant’s 
equipment was operating normally and that the young boy was 
trespassing.15 The only duty owed to the defendant was the duty to 
refrain from committing “intentional or negligent acts of personal 
violence.”16 Indeed, since the owner left the trespasser entirely alone, 
 
 9. E.g., Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Now there is of 
course no general common law duty to rescue a stranger in distress even if the rescue can be 
accomplished at no cost to the rescuer.”). 
 10. See infra Part I.B. 
 11. 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898). 
 12. Id. at 809. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 810. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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the trespasser could not recover for any injury suffered on the 
property.17 
The ultimate holding of Buch, however, is not nearly as 
significant as the reasoning behind it. In justifying its conclusion, the 
court set out in detail the principle behind the no-duty-to-rescue rule: 
Actionable negligence is the neglect of a legal duty. The defendants 
are not liable unless they owed to the plaintiff a legal duty which 
they neglected to perform. With purely moral obligations the law 
does not deal. . . . Suppose A, standing close by a railroad, sees a 
two-year-old babe on the track and a car approaching. He can easily 
rescue the child with entire safety to himself, and the instincts of 
humanity require him to do so. If he does not, he may, perhaps, 
justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral monster; but he is not 
liable in damages for the child’s injury, or indictable under the 
statute for its death.18 
The court identifies a sharp divide between the law and morality. 
Legal duties are enforceable; moral duties are not. 
Distinguishing between moral and legal duties, and finding the 
duty to rescue to be a moral duty, is pervasive in the reasoning of 
early 20th century cases. In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Cappier,19 
the court failed to impose a duty on railroad workers to aid a man 
struck by a freight car.20 In doing so, the court noted that allowing 
courts to enforce moral obligations would let them substitute the law 
with “varying ideas of morals which the changing incumbents of the 
bench might from time to time entertain.”21 In Osterlind v. Hill,22 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the defendant violated no 
legal duty by renting a canoe to an intoxicated man who ultimately 
fell out and drowned.23 While these decisions may seem cold-hearted, 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (emphasis added). 
 19. 72 P. 281 (Kan. 1903). 
 20. Id. at 281–82. The court expounded: “With the humane side of the question courts are 
not concerned. It is the omission or negligent discharge of legal duties only which come within 
the sphere of judicial cognizance.” Id. at 282. 
 21. Id. at 283. 
 22. 160 N.E. 301 (Mass. 1928), overruled by Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 
467, 477 (Mass. 1974). 
 23. Id. at 302. The facts of the case illustrate what some might consider a callous attitude 
toward the victim. After renting the canoe, the defendant apparently listened to the deceased’s 
screams for help for half an hour and did nothing. In fact, the court found the deceased’s ability 
to hang on to the canoe for that long indicated that he was not truly helpless. Id. 
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they illustrate the importance of the existence of a legal duty to 
recovery.24 In approaching the facts of each case, the respective courts 
did not look at the relations between the parties and decide whether 
to impose a legal duty. Instead, they started from the position of no 
legal duty, and then explored the facts to determine whether they 
supported the prior existence of such a duty.25 
A second and related principle behind the early common law no-
duty rule is the law’s distinction between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance.26 Such language can be found in the early case law.27 In 
addition, the principle has been widely cited in legal scholarship as 
the justification for the absence of a positive duty to aid.28 Francis 
Bohlen articulates well both the importance and the source of this 
principle: 
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and 
more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance, 
between active misconduct working positive injury to others and 
passive inaction, a failure to take positive steps to benefit others, or 
to protect them from harm not created by any wrongful act of the 
 
 24. Such holdings would be unlikely today given current exemptions for business-invitee 
relationships and those controlling the instrumentality of harm. See infra Part I.C. 
 25. The use of moral/legal distinctions is not limited to early 20th century cases. See, e.g., 
Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (“The mere fact that Bigan saw [the decedent] in a 
position of peril in the water imposed upon him no legal, although a moral, obligation or duty to 
go to his rescue.”). 
 26. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 
373 (5th ed. 1984) (examining the distinction between action and inaction in the determination 
of the existence of a duty). 
 27. See, e.g., Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 811 (N.H. 1898) (“There is a wide 
difference . . . both in reason and in law, between causing and preventing an injury; between 
doing, by negligence or otherwise, a wrong to one’s neighbor, and preventing him from injuring 
himself . . . .”). This distinction, while weakened by the special relationship exceptions to the no-
duty-to-rescue rule, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c. (1965) (noting the 
confinement of actionability of nonfeasance to the field of special relationships), is still 
acknowledged today. Compare Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 381, 
382–83 (Mich. 1988) (“The common law has been slow in recognizing liability for nonfeasance 
because the courts are reluctant to force persons to help one another and because such conduct 
does not create a new risk of harm to a potential plaintiff.”), with Hart v. Ludwig, 79 N.W.2d 
895, 898 (Mich. 1956) (asserting that, in certain instances of nonfeasance, the significant 
conclusion “relates not to the slippery distinction between action and nonaction but to the 
fundamental concept of ‘duty . . . .’”). 
 28. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 26, at 375 (characterizing the “reluctance to countenance 
‘nonfeasance’ as a basis of liability” as the source of the no duty to aid rule). 
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defendant. This distinction is founded on that attitude of extreme 
individualism so typical of anglo-saxon legal thought.29 
Bohlen goes on to explain the differences between misfeasance and 
nonfeasance. The first difference is the nature of the conduct at issue, 
though some conduct may initially appear to be either or both.30 The 
other difference—the nature of the result31—is more subtle. Bohlen 
explains this difference by assigning positive and negative value to an 
action.32 Misfeasance makes the plaintiff “positively worse off,” 
thereby creating a net injury.33 While it may result in the same 
physical injury, however, nonfeasance is the absence of a positive 
benefit. The plaintiff is no better off but is likewise no worse off; no 
new injury has been caused.34 It is this distinction that is at the heart 
of the no-duty-to-rescue rule, and it is this distinction that courts and 
scholars relax when creating exceptions to that rule. 
B. Exceptions to the No-Duty Rule 
Courts have established several exceptions to the no-duty-to-
rescue rule; the number of exceptions depends upon their 
categorization. To the extent that these exceptions constitute 
nonfeasance, they involve areas “in which custom, public sentiment 
and views of social policy have led the courts to find a duty of 
affirmative action.”35 One author suggests five general exceptions to 
the rule: special relationships; voluntarily undertaking a rescue of the 
victim; negligent injury caused by the defendant; innocent injury 
caused by the defendant; and statutorily created duties.36 This Part 
will examine these exceptions in turn, in addition to one other with 
 
 29. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. 
L. REV. 217, 219–20 (1908). 
 30. Id. at 220. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 220–21. 
 35. KEETON, supra note 26, at 374. 
 36. Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a 
Victim Lying in the Street? What is Left of the American Rule, and Will It Survive Unabated?, 26 
PEPP. L. REV. 353, 355–56 (1999). The author notes that an exception will apply to most rescue 
situations. Id. at 357. Another author would include contractual obligations to rescue in this list. 
See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
423, 426 (1985) (enumerating various contractual obligations to rescue, including, inter alia, 
those applying to lifeguards and nurses). Since this exception could be considered either a 
special relationship or a voluntary undertaking to rescue, it will not be treated separately. 
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interesting implications: the duty not to prevent the giving of aid by 
others. 
Special relationships are a fairly well-established exception to the 
lack of a duty to rescue. Despite distinguishing between misfeasance 
and nonfeasance, Bohlen recognized that the common law does 
impose an active duty of care arising from certain relationships.37 
Courts have created exceptions and imposed a duty upon common 
carriers, innkeepers, and business owners to their guests and 
customers, upon legal custodians to their charges, and upon teachers 
to students.38 A special relationship may also exist when the 
defendant controls the conduct of a third person. Examples include 
parent-child and employer-employee relationships.39 This is certainly 
not an exclusive list.40 Courts are continually recognizing special 
relationships that weaken the general rule.41 
Another exception to the general rule arises from a voluntary 
undertaking to rescue. One who has no duty to rescue a person in 
peril, yet undertakes a rescue of that person, becomes bound to 
exercise reasonable care in the rescue attempt.42 If would-be rescuers 
act negligently, they are subject to liability for the increase in harm 
caused by that neglect.43 One rationale behind the rule is that a 
 
 37. Bohlen, supra note 29, at 221. 
 38. Groninger, supra note 36, at 360. 
 39. Id. at 361. 
 40. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A & 314B (1965) (listing 
relationships where duties arise and defining those duties). The Restatement also asserts that its 
list is not exclusive. Id. § 314A cmt. b. 
 41. Groninger, supra note 36, at 362. Three cases in particular illustrate the extent of 
special relationship exceptions. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 
334, 345–46 (Cal. 1976), the court established the duty of a psychiatrist to warn one who faces 
reasonably foreseeable harm from a patient. In Pridgen v. Boston Housing Authority, 308 
N.E.2d 467, 477 (Mass. 1974), the court held that a storeowner owed a duty to aid a trespasser 
who had climbed into an elevator shaft and was trapped. Finally, in Farwell v. Keaton, 240 
N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich. 1976), the court recognized a special relationship between “companions 
on a social venture.” Id. at 222. 
 42. See, e.g., Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 287 N.Y.S. 134, 135 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1935) (“[I]f a 
defendant undertakes a task, even if under no duty to undertake it, the defendant must not omit 
to do what an ordinary man would do in performing the task.”); see also KEETON, supra note 26, 
at 378 (“If there is no duty to go to the assistance of a person in difficulty or peril, there is at 
least a duty to avoid any affirmative acts which make his situation worse.”). 
 43. Zelenko, 287 N.Y.S. at 135. The court justified its holding on the assumption that, had 
the defendant storeowner not removed the injured customer to another room, a bystander 
would likely have called an ambulance. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
314A(4) (1965) (imposing a duty on one who voluntarily undertakes a rescue and thereby 
deprives him of the normal opportunities of protection); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
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potential rescuer is less likely to attempt a rescue if another is already 
giving aid.44 One might argue that this rule creates a strong incentive 
not to rescue. Since those with no duty to aid can only be liable for 
the victim’s injuries if they undertake a rescue, their charitable 
tendencies are discouraged.45 When the only act undertaken was a 
gratuitous promise to render assistance, early case law did not impose 
an obligation.46 However, when the plaintiff relies on the promise to 
his or her detriment, some courts now impose a duty based upon 
breach of the promise alone.47 
A fairly uncontroversial exception to the general rule is negligent 
injury. If one negligently injures another or negligently places another 
in a dangerous situation, one is under a duty to provide reasonable 
assistance to prevent additional harm.48 The imposition of liability for 
negligence is not novel.49 This exception merely requires negligent 
actors to reasonably attempt to mitigate the harm they caused.50 
Innocent injury presents a less obvious exception. An innocent 
injury occurs when the defendant’s conduct, though without fault, still 
harms another or places another in danger.51 For example, courts have 
imposed a duty on defendants where a child’s hand gets caught in the 
defendant’s escalator,52 the defendant’s truck stalls on an icy road,53 
and the defendant’s vehicle strikes a cow on a road54. In these 
 
323 (1965) (advocating liability for one who undertakes to render services necessary for the 
protection of another, renders the services negligently, and either increases the risk of harm or 
causes harm through the other’s reliance). 
 44. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 45. See Groninger, supra note 36, at 364 (“To the extent people are aware of these 
principles of law, the law has the effect of discouraging rescues.”); KEETON, supra note 26, at 
378 (recognizing the capability of the rule to create a deterrent to voluntary undertaking of aid). 
 46. KEETON, supra note 26, at 379. 
 47. Id. at 380. 
 48. Id., at 377. 
 49. See Groninger, supra note 36, at 357 (asserting that general agreement on liability for 
failure to rescue victim that one has negligently injured exists). 
 50. Parrish v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 20 S.E.2d 299, 305 (N.C. 1942). 
 51. KEETON, supra note 26, at 377. 
 52. L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1942) (noting that the escalator was 
an instrumentality under the control of the defendant). 
 53. Montgomery v. Nat’l Convoy & Trucking Co., 195 S.E. 247, 253 (S.C. 1938). 
 54. Hardy v. Brooks, 118 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961) (asserting that one who 
innocently creates a dangerous situation on a public highway is duty-bound to eliminate the 
danger or warn others of its presence). 
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instances, the defendant is not at fault yet has caused the danger, 
making it easier for courts to create an exception and impose a duty.55 
Perhaps the most far-reaching departure from the general rule is 
the duty to not prevent the giving of aid. Even if one has no duty to 
rescue another, one must still take care not to interfere with another’s 
rescue attempt.56 Such a duty is justified on the grounds that the 
victim should have an opportunity to receive aid.57 In Soldano v. 
O’Daniels,58 a bystander entered the defendant’s inn and requested 
use of its phone to inform the police that a man was being threatened 
with a gun at a saloon across the street.59 The defendant’s employee 
refused access to the phone, and the threatened man was 
subsequently shot and killed.60 In imposing a duty upon the defendant 
to permit use of the phone, the court gave credence to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 327, the expanding list of special 
relationship exceptions, and the moral right of the victim to rescue 
attempts.61 While it paid lip service to the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
distinction and tried to limit its holding,62 the court emphasized its 
“responsibility to reshape, refine and guide legal doctrine . . . .”63 
Finally, a duty to rescue may be imposed by state legislatures. To 
supersede the general common law absence of a duty to rescue, a few 
legislatures have created a statutory duty to report crimes or rescue 
another in peril.64 The statutes that impose a duty to rescue65 only 
 
 55. Groninger, supra note 36, at 359; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 322 
(1965) (imposing a duty of reasonable care to prevent further harm when an actor’s innocent or 
negligent conduct causes bodily harm to another that makes the other helpless and in danger of 
further harm). 
 56. KEETON, supra note 26, at 382; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 326–
327 (1965) (supporting liability for intentionally or negligently preventing a third person from 
giving aid to another). 
 57. KEETON, supra note 26, at 382. 
 58. 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
 59. Id. at 312. 
 60. Id. at 311. 
 61. Id. at 313 n.5 & 316 n.9. 
 62. Id. at 316–17. 
 63. Id. at 317. 
 64. For a thorough list of these statutes and their scope, see Heyman, supra note 8, at 689 
n.66. Heyman cites eight states—Florida, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, 
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Vermont—that punish either failure to rescue or to report, or both, 
as misdemeanors; another, Colorado, declares a duty to report crimes but does not penalize 
violations. Id. 
 65. Note that statutes imposing a duty to aid are different from “Good Samaritan” statutes, 
which encourage bystanders to assist in emergencies by limiting liability for negligent conduct. 
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require reasonable assistance, and only in “easy” rescue situations, 
i.e. without danger to the actor.66 
C. The Future of a Duty to Rescue 
As noted earlier, commentators have criticized the law’s failure 
to require bystanders to effect an easy rescue.67 Scholars have debated 
whether the erosion of the no-duty-to-rescue rule will continue.68 
Prosser and Keeton believe the exceptions to the rule will increase 
until the rule comes to be that mere knowledge of an emergency 
threatening harm to another, when rescue can be had with little cost 
to the rescuer, will be sufficient to impose a duty.69 Even the 
Restatement finds it “inevitable” that, given the “extreme cases of 
morally outrageous and indefensible conduct” permitted by the no-
duty rule, there will be “further inroads” upon it.70 Indeed, this 
appears to be the majority position among scholars. 
II.  THEORIES OF POLITICAL/LEGAL PHILOSOPHY ON  
THE DUTY TO RESCUE 
Most philosophical, political, and legal scholars that address the 
absence of a general duty to rescue in America support the existence 
of a duty in some form.71 Some view the rule as a “legal anachronism” 
 
See Silver, supra note 36, at 427–28 (describing obligations imposed by “Good Samaritan” 
statutes). 
 66. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002) (enacted 1967). Vermont was the first 
state to pass such a law. The statute reads: 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the 
extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without 
interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.. . . .(c) A 
person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more 
than $100.00. 
Id. §§ 519(a) & 519(c). 
 67. Saldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 313. 
 68. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 248 (1980) 
(claiming that the increasing exceptions to the rule have made it seem “eccentric and isolated”). 
But see Lake, supra note 5, at 316–17 (“[R]escue doctrine remains tied to common law concepts 
and tough-talk rhetoric extant at the turn of the century . . . .”). 
 69. KEETON, supra note 26, at 377. 
 70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c. (1965). 
 71. See KEETON, supra note 26, at 376 (noting that decisions recognizing no duty to aid 
“have been denounced with vigor by legal writers”); MICHAEL A. MENLOWE & ALEXANDER 
MCCALL SMITH, Introduction, in THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 1 
(Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1993) (recognizing general philosophical 
consensus on a moral duty to aid). 
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that has worn out its usefulness;72 others seek to make sense out of the 
increasing complexity of the rule and its exceptions.73 A third group of 
legal thinkers, who have articulated the views that follow, attempts to 
set forth the principles on which a duty should or should not be 
founded. This Part will describe five approaches of varying 
abstraction to the duty to rescue. At least four of these theories, and 
perhaps all five, conclude that a duty to rescue should be imposed in 
some circumstances. 
A. Morality 
Probably the most advocated position supporting a duty to 
rescue is simply that rescuing another in peril, in certain 
circumstances, is a moral duty that should be embodied in the law.74 
Some scholars express intense disdain for the immorality of the rule.75 
Others state their conclusions bluntly.76 
One distinction among these opinions is the ultimate purpose 
behind making a moral duty a legal duty. Some argue that, since the 
average person views law as a reflection of morality, the reasonable 
person standard must embrace the majority moral position.77 Others 
want the law to not only reflect public opinion but also to actively 
encourage better behavior.78 
Another source of disagreement in the morality approach is the 
extent to which the law should reflect morality. Though he approved 
 
 72. J.H. Edgar, Jr., The Bystander’s Duty and the Law of Torts—An Alternative Proposal, 8 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 302, 308 (1976). 
 73. See Lake, supra note 5, at 332 (recognizing scholars’ attempts to reconcile present case 
law through policy concerns, efficiency concepts, and other principles). 
 74. Heyman, supra note 8, at 741; Viola C. Brady, Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: 
Implications of Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551, 551 (1980); see also Michael A. Menlowe, 
The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Rescue, in THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 5, 5 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1993) 
(noting “wide philosophical support for . . . a moral requirement to rescue”). 
 75. KEETON, supra note 26, at 375–76 (calling some opinions upholding the rule “shocking 
in the extreme” and “revolting to any moral sense”). 
 76. Menlowe, supra note 74, at 8 (asserting that refusing to effect an easy rescue is simply 
wrong and worthy of punishment). 
 77. See Lake, supra note 5, at 351 n.272 (“An enlightened society should no longer excuse 
the immoral and outrageous conduct of a person who allows another to drown, simply because 
he doesn’t wish to get his feet wet.” (quoting Lombardo v. Hoag, 566 A.2d 1185, 1189 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1989))). 
 78. Antony M. Honoré, Law, Morals and Rescue, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE 
LAW: THE MORALITY—AND THE PROBLEMS—OF AIDING THOSE IN PERIL 225, 240 (James M. 
Ratcliffe ed., 1966); Menlowe, supra note 74, at 45. 
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of bringing the law more in line with morality,79 Professor James Barr 
Ames acknowledged that some moral duties should not be enforced 
in the courts.80 In contrast, Professor Francis Bohlen argued that 
judges should exercise their reasoned discretion when imposing their 
moral beliefs: 
While courts of law should not yield to every passing current of 
popular thought, . . . unless they adopt as legal those popular 
standards which they themselves, as men, regard as just and socially 
practicable . . . they will more and more lose their distinctive 
common law character as part of the machinery whereby free men 
do justice among themselves.81 
Extending Bohlen, and in stark contrast to Ames, is Professor Ernest 
Weinrib’s claim that “the role of the common-law judge centrally 
involves making moral duties into legal ones.”82 
In the end, however, most scholars who advocate a morally 
justified legal duty to rescue tend not to detail the philosophical 
source of this determination. They simply assert that it is true.83 When 
dealing with morally outrageous conduct leading to harm that could 
have easily been prevented, it just feels right to impose a legal duty.84 
B. Utilitarian Theory 
Utilitarians generally support a duty to rescue others, at least to 
the extent that such a duty provides maximum satisfaction to the most 
people.85 In evaluating a rule, utilitarian theory examines the actions 
the rule influences people to take. If those actions produce the 
greatest net pleasure, as compared to any alternative actions, then 
utility is maximized.86 “Consequences are important; how they are 
reached is not.”87 In practice, a utilitarian duty to rescue might merely 
 
 79. James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 113 (1908). 
 80. Id. at 109. 
 81. Soldano v. O’Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Bohlen, 
supra note 29, at 337). 
 82. Weinrib, supra note 68, at 263. 
 83. See Honoré, supra note 78, at 231 (citing United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 801 
(N.D. Cal. 1864)) (flatly asserting the existence of a moral duty to aid others). 
 84. See id. (“[I]f [rescue] efforts should be omitted by anyone when they could be made 
without imperiling his own life, he would, by his conduct, draw upon himself the censure and 
reproach of good men.”). 
 85. Menlowe, supra note 74, at 5. 
 86. Weinrib, supra note 68, at 281. 
 87. Id. 
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require rescue when the benefits of a particular attempt to rescue the 
victim outweigh the costs to the actor.88 
Such a straightforward rule may not result in utility 
maximization, however. If the freedom to act without restriction 
promotes general happiness, then the costs of a significant degree of 
obligation to act for others could outweigh the benefits of rescue.89 
Similarly, if potential victims came to rely on would-be rescuers, the 
victims might undertake more dangerous activities that reduce social 
utility by increasing costs.90 
Advocacy of a utilitarian duty to rescue exists beyond a mere 
social utility calculation. Likely the most famous support in legal 
scholarship for utilitarianism in the duty to rescue context was given 
by Ames: “The law is utilitarian. It exists for the realization of the 
reasonable needs of the community. If the interest of an individual 
runs counter to this chief object of the law, it must be sacrificed.”91 
John Stuart Mill also discusses a general duty to aid another. While 
Mill advocated the primacy of utility over abstract right,92 he also 
stated that the only proper use of coercive power “is to prevent harm 
to others.”93 This principle is consistent with the power to coerce 
positive acts for the benefit of others, including “certain acts of 
individual beneficence, such as saving a fellow-creature’s life.”94 
Indeed, one can cause harm by omission as well as action; one should 
be accountable for both.95 
 
 88. See id. at 282 (asserting that one possible interpretation of the utilitarian system 
supports such a duty). 
 89. See id. at 285 (noting that excessive coercion cannot influence the will and that a duty 
to aid when the rescuer is placed in significant danger should not exist). But see Silver, supra 
note 36, at 431 (positing that the benefit of lives saved from a rescue duty justifies the loss of 
freedom of action). One solution to this problem might be to require rescue, but have the victim 
or state compensate rescuers for their socially useful rescues. Cf. George P. Fletcher, Fairness 
and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 568–69 (1972) (proposing the insulation of 
harm to an individual actor by providing damage awards for socially useful activities). 
 90. See Weinrib, supra note 68, at 283 (“If an act of beneficence would tend to induce 
reliance on similar acts, it should be avoided.”). 
 91. Ames, supra note 79, at 110. 
 92. See J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 9 (R.B. McCallum ed., Basil Blackwell 1948) (1859) (“It is 
proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the 
idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on 
all ethical questions . . . .”). 
 93. Id. at 8. 
 94. Id. at 10. 
 95. Id. 
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C. Economic Theory 
Economic theories of the duty to rescue are actually a subset of 
utilitarian theory because their ultimate goal—efficiency—is 
measured by the maximization of social utility. To achieve this end, 
the law should let individuals transfer resources through a bargaining 
process to their most valued uses.96 The assignment by the law of any 
right is important only when transaction costs burden the bargaining 
process. In that instance, the law should assign the resource to the one 
who valued it more than anyone else.97 
In the duty to aid situation, economic analysis would ignore the 
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance.98 Instead, one 
would explore the social efficiency of the rule. Indeed, Professors 
Landes and Posner have proposed a model explaining why the no-
duty rule is efficient.99 They assume that potential victims and 
potential rescuers are mutually exclusive groups. If liability were 
imposed for failing to rescue, potential rescuers would perform less of 
their preferred activities and undertake other, less risky activities, 
thereby reducing both the utility of rescuers and the social benefit to 
rescue.100 In contrast, Professor Richard Hasen argues that the no-
duty rule is actually inefficient.101 Unlike Landes & Posner, Hasen 
assumes that the classes of victims and rescuers overlap. Since 
potential rescuers gain much utility by the possibility of being rescued 
themselves (assuming that the value of one’s life outweighs the cost of 
rescue), they would not substitute activities and would almost 
certainly favor a duty to rescue.102 The assumption of exclusive or 
 
 96. Ernest J. Weinrib, Right and Advantage in Private Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1283, 
1299 (1989). In stating his positions, Professor Weinrib relies on a theory first proposed by 
Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–13 (1960) (advancing 
an economic analysis of the problem of reciprocal harms and discussing the implications on the 
pricing system and liability rules). 
 97. Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1300. 
 98. Id. at 1299. 
 99. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and 
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 119–24 (1978) 
(“In fact, as our analysis will show, liability may be less efficient than nonliability.”). 
 100. Id. at 119–21. For example, if an expert swimmer has a duty to rescue a novice 
swimmer, the expert might avoid beaches where novices swim, making the expert less available 
to rescue those who would most need rescuing. 
 101. Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient Duty to Rescue, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 144 
(1995). 
 102. See id. at 142–44. 
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simultaneous potential rescuer/potential victim status distinguishes 
the respective models.103 
D. Locke’s Social Contract Theory 
Locke’s Social Contract theory is an expansion of the principle of 
natural law. The state of nature is “a State of perfect Freedom,” 
where each autonomous individual executes the laws of nature upon 
the transgressors of one’s rights.104 Because one’s rights in this state 
are “constantly exposed to . . . Invasion,” individuals remove 
themselves from the state of nature to form a government.105 They do 
so for the “mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates,” 
which Locke calls their “Property.”106 By joining the society, however, 
all members submit their “Person and Possession[s]” to the 
government of the society.107 The government’s laws are meant to 
preserve property,108 but they do so to further the public good.109 
Whether Social Contract theory requires rescue is unclear. On 
one hand, Locke asserts that each person has a property in one’s 
person, to which no one else has a right.110 On the other, “when 
[one’s] own Preservation comes not in competition,” one ought to, as 
much as possible, “preserve the rest of Mankind.”111 Moreover, 
because each person in society surrenders much of one’s natural 
liberty to a properly created government,112 and because the first duty 
of the government is the “preservation of the Society,”113 the 
government would seem to have the power to require rescue to 
further the public good. 
 
 103. See id. at 147. 
 104. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269, 271–72 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 105. Id. at 350; see also id. at 276 (“Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the 
Inconveniences of the State of Nature . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
 106. Id. at 350 (emphasis omitted). 
 107. Id. at 348. 
 108. Id. at 350–51. 
 109. Id. at 353. 
 110. Id. at 287. 
 111. Id. at 271. 
 112. Id. at 353. 
 113. Id. at 355–56 (emphasis omitted). 
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E. Heyman’s Liberal-Communitarian Theory 
Professor Heyman draws material from Locke’s Social Contract, 
as well as Kantian and Hegelian political philosophy, to craft his own 
position on the duty to rescue. Heyman begins with the idea, 
developed by Hegel, that the citizen and the state hold “reciprocal 
rights and duties.”114 The state must secure the rights and welfare of 
citizens, thereby creating a duty to rescue imperiled citizens in 
emergency situations.115 As consideration for this benefit, citizens 
must “perform services necessary for the common good,” including 
acting for the state when none of its officers are available.116 
Therefore, citizens owe a duty to the state to rescue other citizens.117 
When combined with the social contract duty to rescue others, a 
citizen owes a duty of rescue both to the state and directly to other 
citizens.118 Thus, one who fails to discharge a duty to rescue can be 
held liable in both criminal law and tort.119 
Heyman labels the result of this reasoning “a liberal-
communitarian theory of the duty to rescue.”120 Due to the positive 
ethical relationship between citizens, a citizen in peril has “a quasi-
property right” in the services of other citizens.121 Unlike a utilitarian 
rationale, Heyman’s theory does not ignore individual rights but 
specifically includes them as an element of the public good.122 Unlike 
in morality arguments, the duty to rescue is not merely morally 
required; instead, it is embodied in rights and obligations of citizens 
and the state.123 This notion, which Heyman calls a “concrete 
conception of community,”124 creates a duty to rescue on behalf of 
others and at the behest of the state.125 
 
 114. Heyman, supra note 8, at 726 (citing G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF RIGHT § 261R (Allen W. Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1821)). 
 115. Id. at 728–29. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 729. 
 118. Id. at 738. 
 119. Id. at 738–39. 
 120. Id. at 739. 
 121. Id. at 736. 
 122. Id. at 740–41. 
 123. Id. at 742. 
 124. Id. at 745. 
 125. Id. at 749. 
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III.  A RIGHTS/DUTY PARADIGM OF THE DUTY TO RESCUE 
After examining the treatment of the duty to rescue by several 
philosophical and legal theories, this Note will now suggest another: a 
rights/duty paradigm. This model provides a clearer conception of the 
workings of a duty in practice and furthers understanding of the 
doctrines involved. However, for this explanation to be valid, one 
must accept a set of conditions regarding the nature of government 
and human interaction—specifically, the principles of individual 
rights and the negative state. This Part will examine the concepts of 
individual rights and the negative state, based largely on the works of 
philosopher Ayn Rand and Professor Ernest Weinrib, to provide the 
necessary principles. Then, it will present the rights/duty paradigm 
and define its terms. Finally, it will explain the pre-interaction 
conception of “duty” that must be accepted for the rights/duty 
paradigm to accurately assess conflicts between individual interests. 
A. Individual Rights and the Negative State 
Individual rights are the means by which the legal code interacts 
with the fundamental nature of individuals.126 The origin of rights lies 
in one’s existence as a rational being who cannot function properly 
under coercion; therefore, “rights are a necessary condition of [one’s] 
particular mode of survival.”127 The fundamental right from which all 
others derive is the right to one’s own life.128 Since one who has no 
right to the product of his effort cannot survive, the right to property 
is necessary for the implementation of all other rights.129 In practice, 
rights are action-oriented. They demand “freedom from physical 
compulsion, coercion or interference by other men.”130 As such, each 
person’s life and freedom are not owned by or owed to society.131 
The key individual rights concept to grasp for the affirmative 
duty context is the maxim that rights cannot conflict; a “right” which, 
 
 126. AYN RAND, Man’s Rights, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS 122, 122 (1964). 
 127. Id. at 126. 
 128. Id. at 124; see also Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1286, 1290 (stating Hegel’s treatment of 
rights as the expressions of the universal free will and asserting that a person’s body is the 
immediate embodiment of the free will). 
 129. RAND, supra note 126, at 125. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 124. Indeed, since society is merely a grouping of individuals, “society” is not an 
entity itself. Id. at 123. 
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to be exercised, must violate another right, is not truly a right.132 One’s 
rights can impose on another only the negative obligation not to 
violate those rights.133 Consequently, rights to one’s body and 
property are not contingent upon the particular interests or needs of 
others, and “[n]o obligation exists . . . to confer a benefit on anyone 
else.”134 
Given the supremacy of individual rights, the proper government 
has only one purpose – the protection of individual rights.135 This 
principle of individual rights is exemplified by the words of the 
Declaration of Independence: “That to secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed.”136 Implicit in this statement and 
those that follow it is the belief that a government has the ability to 
identify (but not create) rights, adjudicate among its citizens disputes 
concerning those rights, and enforce those rights on behalf of its 
citizens. However, because only the State has the lawful authority to 
use physical force to protect rights, its power can be dangerous to 
citizens.137 Therefore, the government is given no powers except those 
“delegated to it by the citizens for a specific purpose.”138 To protect 
against coercion, all laws must be “objectively justifiable” as 
protecting the rights of individuals against infringement.139 
These considerations lead to the principle of the negative state: 
the State may act only when necessary to protect the individual rights 
 
 132. Id. at 129. 
 133. Id. at 125; see also Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1289 (explaining the central imperative of 
Hegel’s abstract right to respect another’s freedom). 
 134. Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1291. Hegel even addresses the duty to rescue directly: 
“Even if I can accomplish the salvation of another with no real prejudice to myself—for 
example, by tossing a rope to a drowning child . . . abstract right imposes no duty on me to do 
so.” Id. (discussing Hegel’s theory of abstract right); see also RAND, supra note 126, at 129 (“No 
man can have a right to impose an unchosen obligation . . . on another man.”). Hegel goes on to 
modify this conclusion by applying community ethics to abstract right. See generally Heyman, 
supra note 8, at 721–32 (discussing the aspect of community in Hegel’s philosophy of right). 
Hegel’s theory of abstract right by itself seems much nearer the true principles of right than his 
full theory. 
 135. RAND, supra note 126, at 124. 
 136. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 137. RAND, supra note 126, at 131. 
 138. AYN RAND, The Nature of Government, in THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS, supra note 
126, at 144, 149 (1964) (emphasis omitted). Indeed, as rights are defined here, the term 
“individual rights” is redundant, since only individuals are endowed with rights by their nature. 
RAND, supra note 126, at 134. 
 139. RAND, supra note 138, at 149. 
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of its citizens. It may not impose obligations upon them to benefit 
others. Consequently, under a negative state, an individual is free to 
undertake any activity as long as it does not violate the rights of 
others.140 
B. The Rights/Duty Paradigm 
The rights/duty paradigm proposed in this Note is 
straightforward: all rights and duties properly recognized by the law 
are originally negative in character, and every right or duty has a 
corresponding and exactly reciprocal duty or right. Every individual 
right, in the sphere of the law, is inherently negative in character. One 
does not have the right to speak, work, eat, or even live; one has the 
right not to have these freedoms infringed by others. Similarly, one 
does not have a duty to protect the rights of others to speak, work, eat 
or live; one only has the duty not to infringe upon these freedoms.141 
These duties can be characterized as one broad duty not to interfere 
with another’s liberty, or as several distinct duties. Whatever 
characterization is given, each comports with a corresponding right in 
another person or persons that exactly equals the duty in scope. Some 
examples will illustrate this point. Starting with the basics, A does not 
have the right to shoot B, even though A is exercising her free will. B 
has a right not to be harmed by A; A therefore has a duty not to harm 
B. Nor can A take B’s car, even if B has two cars and A has none. B 
has a right not to have her property taken; A has no right to B’s 
property but a duty not to take it. 
This rights/duty paradigm does allow for positive rights and 
duties. However, such positive rights and duties can exist only in the 
sense that they originate in pre-existing negative rights and duties, 
 
 140. See id. at 148 (“Under a proper social system, a private individual is legally free to take 
any action he pleases (so long as he does not violate the rights of others) . . . .”). One might 
wonder how such broad principles could possibly resolve the intricacies of the duty to rescue or 
any other law. Rand recognized this difficulty and addressed it: “Many errors and many 
disagreements are possible in the field of implementation, but what is essential here is the 
principle to be implemented: the principle that the purpose of law and of government is the 
protection of individual rights.” Id. at 152. Parts IV and V of this Note will be using this 
principle as a guide to analysis of the duty to rescue. 
 141. See Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1292 (“The imperative to respect another as a person 
signals a duty to avoid infringements of—rather than to confer benefits upon—the physical and 
proprietary embodiments of another’s personality.”). For purposes of positing a rights/duty 
paradigm, this Note will use the term “negative duty.” Whether such a thing as a negative duty 
can exist is debatable. One could logically argue that a duty not to do something is merely the 
absence of a right to do that thing. 
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and they can always be characterized negatively. For example, 
suppose A contracts with B to build B a house for $10,000, paid up 
front. B could now be said to have a positive right to a house, while A 
has a positive duty to build that house. Yet in a sense, B’s future 
house is her property. She has a right not to have that property 
interfered with. Likewise, A has the duty not to interfere with B’s 
property, which in practice involves an obligation to build the house. 
The rights/duty paradigm, while potentially applicable to the law 
generally, serves especially well in the duty to rescue context. The 
permissible changes in form but not substance of rights and duties are 
central to the analysis. Generally, V has no positive right to aid from 
another, and R has no positive duty to provide aid. Their 
corresponding rights and duties are negative only.142 Suppose, 
however, that R does indeed have a duty to rescue. V can now be said 
to have a positive right to rescue, or at minimum, a legally 
recognizable interest in being rescued. For R to uphold his duty not to 
interfere with V’s right not to be deprived of a legal interest, R may 
have to undertake various kinds of activities. As will be shown in Part 
V, this reasoning might support a duty to rescue in some 
circumstances. 
C. The Conception of Duty 
It is important to recognize that the notion of “duty” in the 
rights/duty paradigm differs dramatically from the current 
understanding of duty. Modern tort opinions see legal duties as a 
flexible element of a tort action; if the defendant should be subject to 
liability, then she was indeed duty-bound.143 A “[d]uty is a legal 
conclusion about relationships between individuals, made after the 
fact . . . . The nature of the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is 
owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct 
 
 142. One might argue that a persons about to drown will soon lose all of their rights, 
including the fundamental right to life, and must therefore be saved. However, the 
characterization of rights as negative refutes this. Since the victim only has a right not to have 
their life interfered with, and a potential rescuer only has a duty not to jeopardize that life, no 
duty may be imposed. There is no positive duty to act for the well-being of another. See 
Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1292 n.21, 1293 (“There are no positive duties in abstract right to do 
anything in particular . . . .”). 
 143. See, e.g., Pridgen v. Boston Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467, 476–77 (Mass. 1974) 
(determining that the defendant could not be “rewarded with immunity from liability” before 
finding the existence of a duty). 
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of the individual.”144 Duties are not absolute but are ever-changing.145 
Only by considering several perspectives can a duty be imposed.146 
The rights/duty paradigm would hold that the breach of a duty, 
which is premised on a fixed principle and defined prior to any factual 
dispute, is in fact the key to tort liability. It is the essential threshold 
requirement that must exist before any consideration of liability can 
occur. Similarly, “[t]hat the plaintiff’s harm can be characterized in 
terms of an invaded right is a necessary condition of liability.”147 A 
duty to rescue context is well suited to illustrating the need for pre-
existing rights and duties. For a general duty to require rescue in any 
form, R must be aware of V’s peril.148 In the modern view, V’s right to 
rescue would be triggered into existence merely by R’s happening to 
see V drowning in a pond or hearing his cries. Not only is there no 
justification for recognizing a positive right to aid in V, but this right 
would be totally contingent on the “mere accidental propinquity” of 
V and R.149 
IV.  COMPARISON OF RIGHTS/DUTY PARADIGM TO THEORIES ON 
THE DUTY TO RESCUE 
Each of the theories discussed in Part II presents a cogent 
position on the duty to rescue. However, this Part will argue that four 
of those theories do not accord the proper status to individual rights 
and state action, thereby highlighting their fundamental inconsistency 
with an approach to the duty to rescue based on negative rights and 
duties. It also submits that the other theory, Locke’s Social Contract, 
may be read either to permit a duty to rescue or to prohibit such a 
duty as an infringement of individual liberty. 
 
 144. RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 650 A.2d 153, 155 (Conn. 1994) (internal 
quotations and citation omitted). 
 145. See Lake, supra note 5, at 358, 364 n.270 (discussing the difficulty of defining duty). 
 146. See, e.g., Soldano v. O’Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 315–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(employing an eight-factor test to determine whether a duty is owed to third persons). 
 147. Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1301. 
 148. To hold otherwise would impose upon every citizen a duty to actively seek out persons 
needing aid. 
 149. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1027 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Eng.). 
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A. Morality 
Law should not be a reflection of popular views on morality 
because morality is subjective, whereas the law is meant to be 
objective—to apply equally and justly to all who live under it. Moral 
principles are subjective in the sense that all individuals do not hold 
one set of identical morals. The problem with “free men do[ing] 
justice among themselves”150 is that they are really doing justice upon 
each other. Because of the State’s enormous power as the only lawful 
user of coercive force, its citizens must restrain its capriciousness. 
They do so by requiring objective, impersonal enforcement of the 
laws.151 To allow subjective application of the law would subject a 
citizen’s rights to the arbitrary choice or belief of a state official, a 
clear inversion of the proper roles of the individual and the state.152 A 
judge should ask not, “What ought I do?”, but rather “What must I 
do to uphold individual rights?” An objective law may still accord 
with a “universally” accepted moral principle; on the other hand, it 
may not satisfy any person’s moral ideals. Only by being objective, 
however, can it be legitimate.153 
B. Utilitarianism 
The conflict between a utilitarian and a rights-based approach to 
the duty to rescue is clear. “Rights are always problematic for 
utilitarians. . . .”154 Without a rights framework to guide levels of 
liability, imposing a burden and failing to confer a benefit are judged 
by equal standards.155 By rejecting the primacy of individual rights and 
making social utility the ultimate concern, a utilitarian duty to rescue 
would potentially impose a heavy burden. The marginal costs of 
restricting freedom decrease with increasingly demanding rules, and 
the potential benefits from rescue—saved lives—likely have a very 
high social value. The result could be the rejection of emergency and 
 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
 151. See RAND, supra note 138, at 148 (“If a society is to be free, its government has to be 
controlled.”). 
 152. See id. at 151 (“[A] man’s rights may not be left at the mercy of the unilateral decision, 
the arbitrary choice, the irrationality, the whim of another man.”). 
 153. Of course, if the law need not be objective, then an individual judge’s views on popular 
morality may be just as appropriate a determinant of the law as any other method. 
 154. Weinrib, supra note 68, at 265 (citing R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90, 
171 (1977)). 
 155. Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1298. 
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convenience limitations on a duty to rescue. Instead, the law might 
create a broad duty of beneficence to others.156 The unwillingness of 
courts and legislatures to actually require rescue even in situations 
dangerous to the rescuer is “the most serious difficulty for a 
utilitarian justification of a duty to rescue.”157 The restrictions upon 
rights are too great. 
C. Economics 
Like utilitarianism, economics rejects any notion of the 
supremacy of rights in the relations among citizens and the 
government.158 Rights are merely the tools for the allocation of 
resources.159 In the economics model, rights are positive, acting as 
tradable commodities; in the rights/duty model, rights are negative, 
acting as proscriptions against interference with freedom. Clearly, 
making the free exercise of one’s rights a commodity, the trading of 
which is encouraged by the State, violates the principles of individual 
rights. 
Some have proposed alternatives to the basic Coasean scheme in 
attempts to alleviate the restrictions on rights. One author proposes 
that the law only impose a duty on those who would voluntarily 
choose it.160 However, this approach views the freedom of action as 
just another interest, albeit a weighty one, that can be overcome with 
the proper incentives. This rule would present two of the problems of 
a moral duty to rescue: a lack of an objective standard for all actors, 
and a duty imposed after the fact. Another strategy to satisfy both 
rights and efficiency might impose a general duty to rescue but 
compensate rescuers for their efforts. While this reasoning may sound 
appealing, it still involves imposing an “unchosen obligation” on an 
individual.161 Moreover, since rescuers’ valuations of their time and 
effort would be inherently subjective and objectively unknowable 
 
 156. Weinrib, supra note 68, at 281. 
 157. Menlowe, supra note 74, at 22. 
 158. Weinrib, supra note 96, at 1299 (“For the economic approach, the function of law is not 
to declare rights but to lubricate the mechanisms that will put the goods to their most valued 
uses.”). 
 159. See id. (“[T]he assignment of rights. . . is without significance . . . [and] merely marks a 
point of departure for the bargaining. . . .”). 
 160. Eric H. Grush, Comment, The Inefficiency of the No-Duty-to-Rescue Rule and a 
Proposed “Similar Risk” Alternative, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 899 (1998). 
 161. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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pre-rescue, it would be impossible to determine appropriate 
compensation for a required rescue. 
D. Social Contract 
Of the five politico-philosophical theories presented here, 
Locke’s Social Contract theory comes closest to accord with the 
rights/duty paradigm. The theory’s ultimate position depends on 
whether Locke is read to favor the preservation of individual liberty 
over the preservation of the public good. Locke recognizes the 
importance of liberty as a right inherent in each individual.162 He also 
recognizes that liberty is subject to the legislative power of the 
society.163 This power must be used to further the common good.164 
The issue then is whether the public good is furthered solely by 
upholding individual rights. At times, Locke suggests that the public 
good is distinct and superior to the rights of particular persons.165 
Were that the case, a duty to rescue that furthered the public welfare 
would be permissible, despite restrictions on individual liberties. 
However, Locke also suggests that each person has only surrendered 
the power to punish interference with individual rights, in order that 
the government can justly make laws and punish offenses.166 The 
government is merely an umpire, settling disputes over the rights of 
its citizens.167 
Because individuals created the State out of necessity, and 
because a person’s most beneficial condition is freedom, the State is 
given the minimum level of powers necessary to address deprivations 
of rights. Under this reading of Locke, citizens would not owe each 
other any duty of charity. The supremacy of individual rights would 
 
 162. See LOCKE, supra note 104, at 393–94 (“Every [person] is born with a . . . Right of 
Freedom to [one’s] Person, which no other [person] has a Power over, but the free Disposal of it 
lies in [one]self.”). 
 163. See id. at 283 (“The Liberty of [one], in Society, is to be under no . . . Restraint of any 
Law, but what the Legislative shall enact, according to the Trust put in it.”) (emphasis omitted); 
id. at 352–53 (noting that one’s natural liberty is confined in many ways by the laws of the 
society). 
 164. Id. at 353. 
 165. See, e.g., id. at 355–56 (“[T]he first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern 
even the Legislative it self, is the preservation of the Society, and (as far as will consist with the 
publick good) of every person in it.”) (emphasis added and omitted). 
 166. Id. at 323–24. 
 167. Id. at 324. 
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prevent one citizen from demanding the aid of another, even through 
majoritarian government force.168 
E. Liberal-Communitarian 
At first blush, Professor Heyman’s liberal-communitarian view 
would also seem to come close to the individual rights perspective. 
Heyman notes that the continuation of the no-duty rule rests not on 
outdated judicial opinions but on principles.169 He recognizes the 
importance of rights to the duty analysis and the need for reciprocal 
rights and duties.170 He also looks to the theoretical foundations of 
these rights and duties to support his own theory.171 
Heyman’s liberal-communitarian view may be internally 
consistent, but the sources from which it draws lead to assumptions 
and characterizations that cannot stand up to the strictures of 
individual rights and the negative state. First, Heyman relies on Hegel 
and Locke to show that citizens and the State owe reciprocal duties to 
each other.172 This principle would of course violate the primacy of 
individual rights and the concept of a state as existing solely for 
protection of those rights. In addition, the extent of the liberal-
communitarian rights and duties is unknowable until circumstances 
occur to trigger their use. 
One such duty owed to the State requires that, when the State is 
unable to fulfill its duty to a citizen to protect that citizen from harm, 
another citizen, aware of the dangerous situation, is obliged to step in 
and act for the State.173 This requirement suggests practical problems 
that undermine Heyman’s theory. First, what level of service must the 
citizen perform? If one takes the place of state actors, must one 
assume their risks and employ their techniques? There are several 
obvious reasons why citizens are not given the same duties and 
authority as police officers or emergency medical personnel. 
Furthermore, the citizens formed a government precisely so that the 
government alone would have the authority to establish laws and 
enforce them objectively. 
 
 168. See supra Part III.A. 
 169. Heyman, supra note 8, at 675. 
 170. See supra text accompanying notes 114 & 122–23. 
 171. See Heyman, supra note 8, at 679 (discussing how Locke’s social contract supports his 
theory). 
 172. Id. at 726. 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 110–12. 
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The obligation to assist others, and their corresponding right to 
that assistance, also illustrates a marked contrast to a theory of 
individual rights. With true individual rights, all rights and their 
corresponding duties are inherently negative. Heyman’s adoption of 
Locke’s social contract and of Hegel’s ethical duties to the community 
also presents a host of line-drawing problems. For example, why 
would a relationship among citizens “based on interdependence and 
mutual trust”174 extend only to rescue in emergencies? Would the duty 
to preserve one’s “community and . . . fellow citizens”175 require giving 
money to a poorer member of the community? What about 10,000 
poorer citizens? A theory of individual rights holds such 
considerations beyond the proper scope of the law.176 
V.  APPLICATION OF THE RIGHTS/DUTY PARADIGM TO DUTY TO 
RESCUE DOCTRINE 
Part IV showed that, in contrast to the rights/duty paradigm, 
several theories that support a general legal duty to rescue another in 
peril do not employ a proper conception of individual rights and the 
negative state. It remains to be seen whether the rights/duty paradigm 
would necessarily reject any duty to rescue. This Part will explore the 
ways in which a rights/duty paradigm would reorder the duty to 
rescue doctrine. It begins by examining the misfeasance/nonfeasance 
dichotomy under the new model. Then, it looks at the language of 
duty to rescue cases and the extent to which their decisions reflect an 
implicit consideration of rights and duties. Finally, this Part applies 
the rights/duty paradigm to the exceptions set out in Part I and 
deduces whether they would still exist under such reasoning. 
A. The Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Dichotomy 
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, widely 
cited in legal scholarship as the deciding principle among early 
common law duty to rescue cases,177 closely parallels the rights/duty 
paradigm. When one commits an act of misfeasance, one has likely 
violated the basic duty not to interfere with the freedoms of another 
(and thus has violated the other’s corresponding right not to have his 
 
 174. Heyman, supra note 8, at 731. 
 175. Id. at 733. 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 138 & 140. 
 177. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29. 
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freedom infringed by another). The misfeasor’s negative duty can 
now be described as an affirmative duty to protect the rights of the 
injured victim. By contrast, nonfeasance likely does not interfere with 
another’s freedoms. Neither a right to rescue nor a corresponding 
duty to rescue is created. 
The correlation between the two principles is not perfect, 
however. It is possible to have a positive right to commit a 
misfeasance178 and a positive duty not to allow a nonfeasance.179 
Because of this disconnect, the proper method of decision should 
not be made purely on action or inaction. Instead, the rights and 
duties of the various parties must be examined. 
B. The Common Law Recognition of Rights and Duties 
The discussion of early common law cases in Part I illustrated the 
use of language regarding duties.180 Such language was not 
uncommon. What is noteworthy, however, is reasoning that implicitly 
incorporates the principles of the rights/duty paradigm. For example, 
in Buch, the court implicitly recognizes that a proper legal obligation 
must be objective and antecedent to the act complained of.181 It also 
noted that a victim’s need of rescue cannot allow that victim to 
impose upon another a legal duty.182 In Cappier, the court suggested 
that basing a law on morality would make it contingent upon the 
arbitrary whim of the judge,183 and that a legal duty to aid may only be 
owed to another individual, not the general public.184 And in 
 
 178. If misfeasance is defined as making another “positively worse off,” see supra text 
accompanying note 31, then an act of self-defense that injures an aggressor would be a 
misfeasance. Such an act would be justified, however, under a rights/duty paradigm. The 
aggressor, by infringing on the freedoms of the victim, has created a positive right in the victim 
to the removal of the infringement. (The aggressor would have a corresponding duty to remove 
that infringement.) Since rights cannot conflict, see supra text accompanying note 132, the 
aggressor would no longer have a right not to be harmed by the victim. Self-defense is a rare 
example of the lawful use of force by one citizen against another. 
 179. For an example, see the contracts hypothetical in Part III.B supra. Note, however, that 
in both of these instances, some actor has already altered the base state of negative reciprocal 
duties. 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 23–25. 
 181. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898) (“The defendants are not liable 
unless they owed to the plaintiff a legal duty which they neglected to perform.”). 
 182. Id. at 811. 
 183. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 184. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903). 
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Osterlind, the court stated explicitly that, because “[n]o legal right of 
the intestate was infringed,” the plaintiff could not recover.185 
Case language supportive of the rights/duty paradigm is not 
limited to early cases. In Yania v. Bigan,186 the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant was liable for goading the 
decedent into jumping into a water-filled pit. The court noted the 
failure of the defendant’s words to “deprive[] [the decedent] of his 
volition and freedom of choice.”187 It also stated that one cannot 
impose legal responsibility on another merely for encouraging 
conduct by the decedent which results in the need for rescue.188 
Based on the language and reasoning of these cases, certain 
courts did in fact recognize the significance of corresponding rights 
and duties. Judges in the early common law era generally understood 
the primacy of negative rights and duties, even if they just hinted at it 
in passing or incorporated its principles into another explanation (i.e. 
the distinctions between misfeasance and nonfeasance or morality 
and the law). As these examples show, cases that deny a broad duty 
to rescue generally do not cite policy considerations, morality, or 
utility. They implicitly acknowledge the right not to have one’s 
freedoms infringed by the imposition of a duty through the conduct of 
another. 
On the other hand, cases that do find a duty to rescue tend to cite 
all manner of reasons: public policy, morality, foreseeability, and 
reasonableness, among others. In Pridgen, the court imposed a duty 
of reasonable care, motivated by the public concern for the safety and 
well-being of others and the ephemeral nature of individual rights and 
duties.189 In Tarasoff, the court required a psychiatrist to meet a duty 
of reasonable care to protect foreseeable victims of patients.190 And in 
Soldano, the court weighed eight separate factors, including 
foreseeability, moral blameworthiness, and public policy, to 
determine the existence of a duty.191 One can deduce from these 
examples that cases imposing a duty to rescue do not rely on strict 
 
 185. Osterlind v. Hill, 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass. 1928), overruled by Pridgen v. Boston Hous. 
Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467, 477 (Mass. 1974) (criticizing the distinction between “misfeasance” and 
“nonfeasance”). 
 186. 155 A.2d 343, 345 (Pa. 1959). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 346. 
 189. Pridgen, 308 N.E. 2d at 477. 
 190. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345–46 (Cal. 1976). 
 191. Soldano v. O’Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310, 315–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
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notions of rights and duties, but rather on a combination of factors, 
each of which is unique to a particular set of facts. Such reasoning is 
antithetical to the principles of a rights/duty paradigm. 
C. Exceptions 
Despite the correlation in the previous cases between recognition 
of the importance of rights and duties and the conclusion that no duty 
to rescue existed, such a result is not preordained. It has been shown 
that, when one views the interaction between two individuals after 
one of those individuals has already acted, positive rights and duties 
may exist.192 This sort of view is especially prevalent in the fact 
patterns of exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule. The following 
discussion will explore whether and under what circumstances a duty 
to rescue could exist under a rights/duty paradigm. 
The mere existence of a special relationship, without more, 
would not likely trigger a duty under a rights/duty paradigm. A 
relationship between R and V would entail a duty to rescue only if the 
potential rescuer, R, committed some act that created in the victim, V, 
a positive interest in being rescued. Absent a contractual agreement 
to undertake rescue as part of the relationship, a duty could almost 
never be imposed, even in relationships traditionally held to involve 
such a duty.193 
Under the paradigm, a voluntary undertaking would create a 
duty to rescue if it included interfering with V’s right to be left alone. 
However, a court could only impose significant damages if R’s 
conduct harmed V in some way. This would include further injury to 
V or removing V to a place where better help could not be procured. 
One might also argue that a mere promise, or a rescue attempt just 
begun, induces reliance in the victim, so as to trigger a positive right 
in V to aid and a positive duty in R to provide that aid. The proper 
result in such a circumstance depends on whether one recognizes 
reliance as a proper method of altering the negative rights balance. 
 
 192. See supra notes 178–79 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 38. Duties could not be imposed in these situations 
because of the inherently negative character of rights and duties. Even though a guest may 
effectively be under the control of an innkeeper, merely agreeing to rent a room does not 
infringe upon any of the guest’s freedoms. The parent-child relationship may be an exception to 
this principle, however. In one sense, a parent brings about the existence of a child. Yet for 
several years, children are incapable of understanding their inherent rights and duties and 
exercising many of the freedoms adults possess. Since the parent created the child, knowing it 
would not have the capacity to reason, the parent has the positive duty to care for the child. 
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The problem with reliance in this context is that it comes dangerously 
close to allowing V to impose a positive duty upon R without R 
having objectively harmed any of V’s interests. If the law enumerated 
certain conduct that would essentially “allow” reliance, a duty could 
justly be imposed in such instances.194 
Causing negligent injury is a clear-cut case for the paradigm. The 
negligent injury of V by R would always involve a duty to rescue, 
because negligence that puts V in need of rescue presupposes that R 
interfered with a negative right of V. 
The innocent injury case presents an interesting study for the 
rights/duty paradigm. Suppose a case where R’s truck stalled on a 
bend in an icy road with no fault on his part.195 Does R have a duty to 
V, another traveler on the road? If so, what is the extent of that duty? 
Initially, V has a negative right not to be harmed. Whether 
negligently or innocently, R placed the truck in the middle of the 
road, thereby jeopardizing V’s right.196 Consequently, V now has a 
positive right in the sense that R has a positive duty to prevent harm 
to V. However, R’s duty exists only to the extent that her action has 
infringed upon V’s negative rights. If V crashes, but the crash is due to 
another cause, then R has no duty to rescue. In addition, once the 
danger represented by R’s truck is removed, R’s positive duty to act 
for V ends. 
Whether a third person is under a duty not to prevent rescue is a 
very close question under the rights/duty paradigm. The central issue 
is whether V’s right not to be harmed entails the right to have 
potential rescuers act unmolested. In a case like Soldano,197 where a 
rescuer desires to use an instrumentality owned by the third party, 
there would be no duty. To hold otherwise would allow someone in 
 
 194. This rule would be similar to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965), supra 
note 43. 
 195. The fact pattern here draws on Montgomery v. Nat’l Convoy & Trucking Co., 195 S.E. 
247 (S.C. 1938). 
 196. Note that the threat of force infringes one’s rights. Putting a gun to another’s head to 
influence that person’s behavior limits his lawful freedom of action as surely as if he were 
physically bound. 
 197. Soldano v. O’Daniels, 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). For a brief discussion of 
this case, see supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
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need to impose upon another the positive duty to provide the use of 
property without consent.198 
However, a person certainly has the freedom to ask others to act 
for her benefit. V does not violate the rights of R or anyone else by 
asking for a favor (absent coercion). Of course, V does not have a 
positive right to R’s help. Meanwhile, the third party has a duty not to 
interfere with the freedoms of others. The issue is whether the third 
party’s duty not to interfere with R can be transferred to V. There 
would be no doubt of the third party’s liability if R had been 
contracted by V to, say, purchase her antidote to snake venom. Since 
V could be said to have a positive right in the performance of the 
contract, and R a positive duty to act to meet that right, interference 
by a third party would frustrate this right. Of course, a mere promise 
by R to render aid is likely not enough of an act to create a positive 
right in V. However, if one recognizes reliance as a proper means to 
alter negative rights, and V relied on R’s promise to forego seeking 
help elsewhere, then the third party’s duty to R would be transferable 
to V. 
Finally, the rights/duty paradigm would forbid duties to rescue 
imposed by statute. Even though duty-to-rescue statutes tend to limit 
their scope to reasonable action undertaken without peril to the 
actor,199 they still impose positive duties on rescuers, without their 
consent, to act on behalf of another. 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the no-duty-to-rescue 
rule is that it is still a rule at all. Most scholars embrace the many 
exceptions to the rule, then ask the courts to continue the trend by 
applying various subjective factors in their duty “calculations.” 
Should this trend continue, the no-duty rule will lose any character as 
a principle for decisions; it will merely be the starting point of a 
judge’s reasoning, quickly lost in the discussion of exceptions, 
interesting facts, and the judge’s own feelings about the moral 
conduct of each actor. The ultimate decision may or may not cite 
precedent, but it would be filled with independent reasoning 
regardless. After all, “[t]he question is not whether the law may 
 
 198. Imposing a duty here would violate both the maxim that rights cannot conflict and the 
requirement that laws be applied consistently according to objective principles, rather than 
varying according to the exigencies of the moment. 
 199. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002) (enacted 1967). 
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compromise our independence because it does that all the time. The 
question is when can it.”200 
By setting out the structure of duty-to-rescue doctrine and the 
principles on which it was founded, this Note attacks the underlying 
premise of the preceding quotation. Through an exploration of 
individual rights and the negative state, an examination of five 
theories of political/legal philosophy, and the application of a 
rights/duty paradigm, this Note exposes the shortcomings of 
prevailing theories of duty-to-rescue doctrine. Ultimately, based upon 
a proper conception of individual rights and the concept of a negative 
state, the law should not compromise the independence of individuals 
by enforcing a legal duty to rescue. 
 
 200. Kathleen M. Ridolfi, Law, Ethics, and the Good Samaritan: Should There Be a Duty to 
Rescue?, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957, 963 (2000). 
